On October 26, 2008, President Nguyen Minh Triet of Vietnam embarked on a 4-day official visit to Russia, described as very important in expanding the strategic relationship between the two countries. This particular trip followed a flurry of diplomatic visits including a trip to China in late May by communist party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, a visit to the U.S. in June by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and most recently another visit to China in October by Prime Minister Dung.
It should be noted that prior to both visits to the U.S. in June and Russia in October, Vietnamese leaders paid visits to China. It is certainly not a coincidence but very much by design that visits to China must precede trips to the U.S. and Russia. This is a clear indication of the complicated tightrope diplomacy the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leadership is engaging in.
In the early 1990’s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, VCP leaders understood that to hang on to power, they had to climb out of the economic mess. For the last 20 years, they have been trying to do that with the help of foreign investment and by trading with the rest of the world. They worked hard to cultivate a closer relationship with the U.S. knowing those ties to be critical to sustain economic development. However, they also face pressure from the U.S. to improve human rights, and at the same time remain wary of the “peaceful evolution” threat undermining their one-party dictatorship.
Thus, while building a closer relationship with the U.S., VCP leadership also hedges their position by trying hard to maintain a “fraternal” relationship with the communist regime of China. However, this has proven to be a difficult task for many reasons. First is the long history of distrust and hostility between the two countries. Second is China’s aggression and bullying attitude toward Vietnam especially regarding territorial dispute. Third is China’s continuing effort to meddle with the internal affairs of the VCP.
In that context, since the mid 1990’s, the VCP has been walking a tightrope between China and the U.S., playing both sides to counter-balance one another. Hanoi obviously needs but yet wary of both partners. However, that acrobatic act may take a new twist with the reemergence of Russia.
Throughout the Vietnam War until the late 1980’s, the former Soviet Union was communist Vietnam’s main ally and supporter. With the end of the Cold War, Russia faded from the scene in Vietnam for more than 15 years. Recently, Russia began to reassert its position on the world stage and Vietnam is a logical beachhead for Russia to come back to Southeast Asia. For Russia, an alliance with Vietnam, a country with 85 millions people and a strategic location, can serve Russia’s interest very well. For the VCP, given past experience with the Soviet Union, they must feel a lot more comfortable with Russia as a partner, much more than both the U.S. and China.
Thus, it is not surprising that during President Triet’s visit, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that “Russia and Vietnam share close or identical positions on international affairs.” Both sides pledged closer economic relationship including an agreement to develop energy fields off the coast of Vietnam. In addition, President Triet said, “Vietnam is interested in expanding military-technical cooperation with Russia for strengthening the country’s defense capability.” Russia has agreed to sell military equipment to Vietnam and provide training for the Vietnamese military. Of course, President Triet was careful not to anger China by saying that security cooperation with Russia is “purely defensive and is not aimed against third countries.”
Although still early, but can Russia be the partner that the VCP is looking for to counter both the U.S. and China? Will Hanoi’s tightrope diplomacy continue to work? Given the nature of the VCP, if Russia comes into the mix, things may take a dangerous turn for the VCP. That is because despite their efforts to appear unified, the VCP is not a monolithic entity. In fact, the VCP remains divided especially at the top, not in the sense of reformists versus hardliners, but more about different approaches to maintaining power and opposing cliques fighting for financial gains. Currently, there are factions within the leadership either more pro-U.S. or more pro-China. With Russia coming onto the scene, a pro-Russia faction within the VCP may emerge to increase friction and fuels even more infighting.
If that possibility exists, why would the VCP continue to engage in this type of policy? The answer is simply because their top priority is to maintain their hold on power as long as possible. Thus, they must try to engage all partners critical to their survival. Instead of choosing the best policy for the country, they let self-interest dictate and swept Vietnam into an unnecessary balancing act. Although it is a dangerous game but nevertheless they must play that game to preserve their one-party rule and continue to reap the financial rewards that come with it.
Instead of continuing on this selfish and destructive path, the best policy for the nation of Vietnam is to pursue a 3-prong approach:
• Establish a strong democracy as the foundation for long term stability and development,` • Expand trade and further integrate into global economy, and` • Engage more with ASEAN and not seek foreign patrons whether it is the U.S., China or Russia.
If that happens, Vietnam will be an important stabilizing force in Southeast Asia, and a much more reliable partner for the world on all fronts especially economic and regional security.
